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Abstract 
Derivative pricing is about cash flow discounting at the riskfree rate. This teaching 
has lost its meaning post the financial crisis, due to the addition of extra value adjustments 
(XVA), which also made derivatives pricing and valuation a very difficult task for 
investors. This article recovers a properly defined discount rate that corresponds to 
different collateral and margin schemes. A binomial tree model is developed, enabling end-
users to price in counterparty default and funding risk. Coherent XVAs, if needed, naturally 
result from decomposing the discount rate, and can be computed on the same tree. 
 
Keywords: derivatives pricing, riskfree rate, derivatives discounting, derivative financing, 
valuation adjustments, XVA. 
 
Derivative pricing to is about discounting, once the underlying market dynamics is 
prescribed. In the classic Black-Scholes (B-S) option pricing model, the expected option 
payoff is discounted at the riskfree rate to arrive at the fair price. In fact, the discovery of 
this celebrated model was keyed on the correct discount rate, according to Black and 
Scholes (1973),  
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author, and do not reflect those 
of his employer and any of its affiliates. 
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"What they fail to pursue is the fact that in equilibrium, the expected return on such 
a hedged position must be equal to the return on a riskless asset. What we show below is 
that this equilibrium condition can be used to derive a theoretical valuation formula."  
The return on a riskless asset, or the riskfree rate, later became the cornerstone of 
the risk-neutral pricing theory and routine derivatives valuation practice. In the US, 
Treasury securities’ zero coupon rates were historically taken as the riskfree rates since the 
government bonds are considered default-free (at least in their own currency) and having 
zero coupon removes any reinvestment risk. While this satisfied theorists, practitioners 
soon found a disconnect between this theoretical rate and the operational funding rate, the 
rate at which they got charged for their intra-bank borrowing in relation to derivatives 
trading. Recognizing that the treasury rate was only accessible to the government’s 
financing, some firms attempted using Treasuries repo rates as the riskfree rates. Most of 
the dealer-banks were funded at LIBOR (London Intra-Bank Offered Rates) pre-crisis, so 
the LIBOR curve, a series of zero rates inferred from the LIBOR rates and LIBOR indexed 
swap rates, emerged as the de facto standard for derivatives and structured products. 
Discounting on the LIBOR curve or LIBOR discounting, however, is not the 
complete story even prior to the financial crisis. Since non-exchange traded, over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives are traded between defaultable counterparties, they are exposed 
to counterparty’s credit risk 2 . More sophisticated dealer banks started to compute a 
counterparty credit value adjustment (CVA) made to the default risk free fair price. 
Consequentially the riskfree rate is no longer the discount rate leading to the final price. 
                                                 
2 Since LIBOR is an average of intra-bank unsecured rates, its replacement of the treasury curve as the 
riskfree rate is thought to have largely taken into account of intra-bank counterparty credit risk. Some 
consider this as the justification to use LIBOR, Huge and Lando (1999).  
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The fact that CVA definitions vary and often get watered down in implementations makes 
difficult to perceive that a derivative discount rate even exists. 
The surge in TED (Treasuries and Euro Dollar deposit, i.e., Treasuries and LIBOR) 
spread during the credit crunch of 2007-2008 readily rejected LIBOR as a good 
approximation of the riskfree rate, as the difference of the three month LIBOR rate and 
Treasuries bill rate spiked, for instance, to 4.64% on 10//10/2008. In the meanwhile, banks 
were found unable to fund anywhere close to LIBOR levels, indicating that banks’ credit 
risk could diverge from what LIBOR represents. The practice of discounting derivatives 
cash flows exclusively at the LIBOR is thus no longer appropriate, and LIBOR itself has 
been subject to intense scrutiny and pending replacements3.  
Realizing that fully collateralized derivatives are essentially counterparty credit risk 
free and cash funded at the overnight indexed swaps (OIS) rates, the industry quickly 
forged a consensus to discount such derivatives at the OIS curve, or OIS discounting. The 
rest of the OTC derivatives were initially left with LIBOR discounting, or the same OIS 
discounting (Hull and White 2013). This didn’t last long however, as some banks, aware 
of the fact they funded away from LIBOR, started using their own funding rates to compute 
a funding valuation adjustment (FVA) on uncollateralized derivatives.  
As Hull and White (2014) pointed out, this FVA equates to discounting an 
investment’s cash flows at the investor’s funding rate rather than the project’s risk based 
return rate, and as such is at conflict with fundamental principles taught in finance. Typical 
FVA definitions, however, no longer allow a clear identification of a discount rate 
                                                 
3 LIBOR Sunset: LIBOR is set to discontinue in the last quarter of 2021, to be replaced by the Secured 
Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). It includes tri-party Treasuries repo data, and cleared bilateral and GCF 
repo data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. 
   
4 
 
applicable to future derivatives cash flows. The industry has since endeavored to mitigate 
counterparty risk by moving towards to central counterparty (CCP) clearing and enforcing 
similar margin and collateralization schemes if non-CCP cleared. Other value adjustments 
(XVA) emerged, such as MVA for margin, and LVA for collateral liquidity, complicating 
the matter further. It is safe to say that no trace of a unique discount rate can be found in 
the final price, when all these XVAs are accounted for. 
On the collateral side, different types of assets and margining schemes are possible. 
Cash collateral, for instance, could be segregated, treasury securities are commonly 
admitted in lieu of cash, and non-government securities are often accepted. The primary 
purpose of derivatives collateral is of course to mitigate counterparty credit risk, but it also 
serves a secondary purpose of funding. Non-segregated cash collateral, for example, can 
be used by the receiving firm for its general corporate purposes. It can certainly be used to 
fund the dealer’s operations, and thus brings funding benefit as its interest rate is the lowest 
possible, the overnight Federal Funds rate. If cash is segregated, then it can only be drawn 
when counterparty defaults. Segregated cash, therefore, provides only credit protection but 
not funding. Different collateralization schemes thus have side effects and a discount rate, 
if exists, would have to be commensurate. 
The notion of riskfree discounting has been blurred amid serious challenges from 
the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Needless to say, it has caused confusion and 
complicated derivatives pricing and valuation tasks, especially for derivatives end-users. 
This paper sets out to reestablish the discounting rate for post-crisis OTC derivatives 
pricing and valuation. The derived final price incorporates counterparty risk and reflects 
collateralization schemes. Presentation of such a rate benefits market participants by 
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affirming our usual textbook understanding of discounting an investment project’s future 
cash flows corresponding to the project’s risk characteristics. Derivatives end-users who 
are familiar with binomial tree pricing models can simply modify their models to solve for 
the final price by properly choosing its local discount rate at each tree node during the 
rollback discounting step. 
The same binomial tree procedure can be used to compute fair value and XVAs 
simultaneously, allowing end-users to come up with their own XVA estimations 
independently and to better understand broker-dealers or banks’ OTC derivatives pricing 
adjustments. In the US, for example, the Dodd Frank Act requires that swap dealers provide 
their customers with pre-trade mid-market marks (PTMM). Their actual pricing will be 
shown as a spread to PTMM that could include credit, hedging, funding, liquidity, and 
other adjustments. Dealers’ practice could vary widely, as there is no consensus whether 
some XVAs should exist and how they should be computed. In this paper, all these 
adjustments are treated as a coherent decomposition of a fair value which is unequivocally 
linked to components of a risk-sensitive discount rate. 
 
1. Incorporating stock financing in the B-S model 
Before we proceed to derive discount rates appropriate to various derivatives 
collateralization schemes, it is important to recognize that the riskfree rate, although critical 
to Black and Scholes (1973)’s discovery, is not strictly necessary. Starting with a long stock 
and short call option hedged portfolio, Black and Scholes argued that the hedge ratio could 
change so that at any given moment the hedge portfolio value change does not depend on 
the stock price and is thus free of market risk. Such a portfolio then can’t be arbitraged 
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against a riskless security. So in market equilibrium, "the expected return on such a hedged 
position must be equal to the return on a riskless asset" by virtue of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). The option price V(S, t) as a function of stock price S and time t is governed 
by the following partial differential equation (PDE) -- the Black-Scholes equation,  
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where σ is the volatility of the stock, q the stock dividend yield, and r is the rate of return 
on a riskless asset or the riskfree rate. There are two appearances of r, one in the second 
term relating to the stock, and a second one in the fourth term to indicate that the option 
value is discounted at r. The latter is obvious in the risk-neutral pricing formula, e.g., that 
of a European call option with strike K, 
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tTrQ
t       (2) 
where E denotes the usual expectation operator in the risk-neutral world Q in which the 
expected return of the stock is the riskfree rate, )( tTre   the riskfree discount factor, 
 )( KST  call option payoff. 
With regard to the first appearance, r can be taken as the assumed stock financing 
rate. This is indeed one of the basic assumptions, assumption (f) from Black and Scholes 
(1973): "It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security to buy it or hold it, 
at the short-term interest rate, which is known and constant through time." Black and 
Scholes’ derivation and Merton’s derivation, however, do not make explicit use of this 
riskfree rate financing assumption to show the funding cost is actually zero. r in equation 
(1) is a result of a perfectly hedged portfolio having to return at the same rate as a riskless 
asset to avoid arbitrage or to achieve market equilibrium. This blanket styled funding 
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assumption is obviously unrealistic, but it conveniently allows them to focus on finding a 
no-arbitrage solution to option pricing. Facing the operation aspect of hedging and 
financing the stock hedges, the industry has long recognized the fact that stocks can’t be 
financed at the riskfree rate and has replaced it with a stock repo rate in practice. As shown 
below, assumption (f) can be made more precise and realistic by allowing stocks to be 
financed through the stock financing market.  
 
To borrow money to buy stock, the cheapest way is to borrow from the repo market. 
A repo is a repurchase agreement where a security is sold to a financer and will be 
purchased back at a stated higher price on a later date. The initial purchase price is 
essentially a cash loan amount and the difference between purchase and repurchase prices 
is the financing interest. A repo is economically a loan collateralized with the bought stock 
shares. The loan amount is tied up to the market value of the stock shares, after a discount. 
For example 500 shares of stock with market price at 100 will receive a loan of 40,000 
after a 20% haircut is applied.  
Assumption (g) of Black and Scholes (1973) further states "no penalties to short 
selling", which can be understood to mean that there is no stock borrowing cost and the 
short sales proceeds are immediately available to the short seller. Borrowing stock to short 
is done through the securities lending (sec lending) market. The short seller typically pays 
a borrowing cost to the securities lender (sec lender) for the use of the security. When the 
borrowed security is sold in the open market, the sales proceeds are handed over to the 
security lender as collateral to mitigate the borrower’s credit risk. Not only that, additional 
cash margin is required to secure the sec lender in case of a market surge causing the 
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borrower unable to buy back the security to return to the lender. This margin is similar to 
repo haircut in purposes and mechanism. 
Following Merton (1973) and Shreve (2004), we set up an economy or portfolio 
that consists of the short European call option fair valued at Vt, long Δt shares of the 
underlying stock St, and a money market or bank account
4 with balance Mt. The portfolio 
value denoted by πt is πt = Mt + ΔtSt – Vt. Merton starts with π0 = 0 and states that the no-
arbitrage condition would require that the portfolio remain zero valued, i.e., πt = 0 for all 
t<T, which leads to Mt = Vt- ΔtSt. In particular, M0 = V0- Δ0S0. For a call option, M0<0, and 
in fact Mt<0. A negative balance means that we need to borrow money to fund the initial 
portfolio. 
Riskfree borrowing of cash is of course never possible from a funding perspective. 
Suppose that stock can be financed at zero haircut, at a rate of rs. We now expand the 
economy to include a repo borrow account Lt, with total portfolio value  
πt = Mt + ΔtSt – Vt – Lt.       (3)  
Because of zero haircut, we are able to borrow at the full amount, i.e., Lt= ΔtSt. 
Again, the economy starts at zero value, π0 = 0, so M0 = V0, the initial balance of the bank 
account is exactly the option sale proceeds. Setting πt = 0 for all t<T leads to Mt = Vt >0. 
Now Mt is positive, a sure deposit, so we don’t need to borrow money in this economy. 
                                                 
4 In terms of presentation and notation, Merton (1973) uses a riskless bond, Shreve (2004) uses a money 
market fund account, and others use a bank (savings) account. Here we adopt the bank account notation to 
distinguish cash deposit from cash borrowing, as different interest rates apply. Obviously the money market 
fund is assumed riskless, although the late financial crisis has shown the contrary. The constant riskfree rate 
in the original B-S model was extended to stochastic riskfree rate by Merton (1973) who also provides an 
alternative derivation in continuous time showing that the B-S model can be obtained under a no-arbitrage 
condition, weaker than a general market equilibrium assumption under the CAPM. Merton compliments the 
hedging portfolio with a riskless bond. The riskfree nature of the discount rate maintains. 
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With initial cash flow and funding set, we consider incremental funding. Since the 
stock financing account is tied up to the delta hedging strategy via Lt= ΔtSt, there will be 
an incremental repo funding amount of dLt available when the stock price moves in time. 
To rebalance delta hedging, we need to buy dΔt  more shares of stock at the price of St+dSt 
, so the payment amount is dΔt(St+dSt). Other cash flow items include stock dividend 
income of qΔtStdt, interest income from the bank account rMtdt, and interest payment to 
the stock repo account rsLtdt. Now that the economy is segregated, the net cash flow in this 
dt period is saved back into the bank account, resulting in the financing equation as follows, 
,)( dtLrdLdtSqdSSddtrMdM tstttttttt      (4.a) 
The last term of (4.a) is the repo interest the economy pays to the repo lender. As 
dLt=d(ΔtSt)=dΔt(St+dSt)+ΔtdSt, the increased stock funding and payment for additional 
hedge purchases net out to ΔtdSt. Therefore, apart from financing the stock purchases, the 
repo account may have extra capacity (ΔtdSt) funding the economy when stock price goes 
up, or take away funding from the economy when St decreases. This observation is very 
important as it explains how the option is funded a bit later. Rearrange (4.a) as 
,)( dtSqrdSdtrMdM ttstttt        (4.b) 
This is more familiar form of the self-financing equation, e.g., in Shreve (2004). ΔtdSt is 
exactly the unrealized profit-n-loss (pnl) on holding Δt shares. Alternatively we can think 
of this as realized pnl since in the B-S model, trading can be done continuously without 
any transaction cost. Such is the case, the realized pnl is immediately reinvested in the same 
stock, and it does not results cashflow. Therefore, interpreting ΔtdSt as realized or 
unrealized pnl does not make any difference. The right hand side of (4.b) is the net trading 
gain, trading pnl net of stock financing cost and dividend income. 
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 From equation (4.b), replace Mt with Vt as Mt=Vt, 
))(( SdtqrdSdtrVdV stttt        (5) 
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Choosing the delta hedging strategy 
S
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 to eliminate dSt term, equation (6) results in 
the B-S equation, 
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The only difference from the original B-S PDE (1) is that the stock financing rate rs has 
taken the place of r in the second term. The second appearance of r in (1) remains, but we 
could have used a different notation, as it now stands for the interest rate earned in the bank 
deposit account. Its meaning of being a riskfree rate is not necessarily lost (yet) because 
the cash deposit in a fed reserve bank account is both credit and market risk free. 
As a relevant note, the risk neutral rate of return of the stock is rs-q, different from 
the classic B-S model. Of course, this can be thought of an adjusted dividend, i.e., q` = q-
(rs-r), so that rs–q = r – q`. The interpretation is clear in that the stock borrowing cost has 
to be deducted from the stock dividend. 
1.1. Stock financing rate in practice 
As shown above, the rather broad riskfree borrowing assumption (f) of the B-S 
model can be narrowed down to zero haircut stock financing at the repo market rate. This 
pulls the B-S model closer to reality, although zero haircut is not typical in the repo market.  
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Practically, recognizing that haircut is usually a small percentage, we can incorporate its 
impact approximately. For example, traders typically treat rs as the overall funding cost, 
by using a simple formula rs = h*rb+(1-h)*rp, where h is the haircut, for example 0.15 for 
15%, rp is the repo rate and rb is the rate applicable to the haircut portion, typically an 
average of dealers’ unsecured financing rates. 
Lou (2015a) finds that having to fund the haircut portion at unsecured rates plays a 
role in options market maker’s bid/ask spread. To hedge a net short delta inventory, for 
example, a market maker needs to buy stock with repo financing and pays the unsecured 
rate on the haircut portion not covered in the repo market. To compensate for the funding 
cost, he will lower his bid.  Similarly with a net long delta inventory, he needs to short 
stock. The additional cash margin on top of the short sales proceeds still needs to be 
financed at the unsecured rate. The cost so incurred pushes his ask higher. With either long 
or short delta inventories, the additional funding costs widen the bid/ask spread. It is shown 
that reasonable funding cost parameters can easily produce same magnitude of bid/ask 
spread of less liquid, longer term options as observed in the market place. 
 
2. Derivatives Financing 
In terms of financing the call option’s only cash flow, i.e., the payoff at expiry T, 
with the aid of a zero-haircut stock financing market, the initial transaction price V0 alone 
is sufficient to fund the European option’s cash flow at the expiry: if stock price at T is 
greater than strike K, the bank account balance would have grown to (ST-K)
+, and the repo 
account closes with the exchange of 100 shares and money; otherwise, the money in the 
bank account would have been drawn to pay the repo lender and reduced to zero. This can 
   
12 
 
be seen by integrating equation (4.b) over time interval [0, T], and noting M0 = V0, and MT 
= VT, 
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The above equation shows that the option payoff is replicated by the initial cash 
deposit in the bank account and trading gain due to the delta hedging strategy. All funding 
needs are met and the delta hedged option economy with a zero haircut stock financing 
market is complete and self-financed. No riskfree borrowing needs to be assumed.  
Some investors could ask whether there is a capacity of leveraging up on the option 
purchase. This brings about the topic of derivatives financing. Unlike stock financing that 
has unambiguous meaning, derivatives financing is a term warranting clarification. To be 
sure, there is no securities financing market that takes in derivatives as collateral to lend 
money or lends derivatives in the same way as stock is lent to facilitate a short. Sometimes, 
the term is loosely used to mean derivatives based securities financing, for instance, lending 
money out in the form of a total return swap (TRS) or credit default swap (CDS), instead 
of a repo. This usage situation is similar to the term “swap financing”, which means using 
swaps to exchange fixed rate financing for floating rate or vice versa, or to exchange one 
currency for another, but has no bearing with using swaps as collateral to borrow money. 
Suppose, hypothetically, a derivatives financing market exists and operates in the 
same way as a stock financing market.  Let rd denote the derivatives repo rate. Consider 
the dealer-bank buys rather than sells an option as in the last section. If we treat equation 
(3)’s Vt as algebraic, positive meaning the short position value, negative long position, then 
Mt = Vt still stands, although Mt = -|Vt| < 0  now. A negative Mt means the economy is 
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borrowing from, not depositing into, the bank account. The overnight Fed Funds rate no 
longer applies. So the dealer-bank opens a repo transaction pledging out the option for 
money at the interest rate of rd. By following the same derivation steps, equation (7) 
remains valid, except with r replaced by rd, and the call option’s fair price is also updated, 
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Comparing with pricing formula (2), the hypothetic derivatives repo financing rate 
becomes the discount rate.  
Although hypothetic, separation of financing underlying stock hedging activity and 
financing the option allows the riskfree rate assumption or any of its implication to be 
detached from the option pricing formula.  
The rest of the paper discusses a limited yet realistic form of derivatives financing 
and its impact on derivatives pricing through an effective derivatives financing rate or the 
discount rate.  In this regard, we use the term derivatives financing to mean any realization 
of liquidity, aka cash, related to a derivatives position or trade but not to the derivative 
product itself. Swap margin movements, for example, are related to the trade, but are not 
considered to be part of the swap’s native cash flows. Accordingly, the term “derivative 
financing rate” means the rate at which the derivative attracts liquidity, for instance, the 
OIS rate for fully cash collateralized trades. 
2.1. Financing in fully cash collateralized derivatives 
A cash collateralized derivative entails a daily exchange of cash margins in the 
amount of derivatives’ market-to-market, or fair value changes. It essentially sets up a 
private settlement mechanism same as exchange traded futures contracts.  
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Consider the ATM call option between two fully collateralized parties B and C 
where B shorts the call option. The option is a liability of B’s and is an asset to C. Under a 
full collateral Credit Support Annex (CSA, the legal collateral agreement used for swaps 
and other derivatives under ISDA Master Agreements), B has to post a cash amount same 
as the option value to party C, who has full and unrestricted control of the cash. In fact, 
even on day 1 when the option is transacted, C sends over V0 cash amount to purchase the 
call option from B, and B has to post the same amount to C on the same day as day 1 
margin. In the end, the same amount of cash comes back to C. C does not have any net cash 
flow, while having bought an ATM call option from B. C’s treasury department does not 
need to come up with that cash amount for its option trader.  
Same can be said of B: it doesn’t see cash flow either while selling the call option. 
At the issue, therefore, a fully cash collateralized option has zero funding need for both 
counterparties. 
 Now on day 2, suppose the stock price increases and the ATM call becomes in-the-
money, valued at V1, V1>V0. Under the CSA, B would have to shove over an amount of 
cash equal to V1-V0 as variation margin (VM) to party C. Where does B get this cash 
amount? In other words, how does B fund the margin? 
Since the option fair value equals to the bank account balance, Mt=Vt, we have 
dVt=dMt. But dV is exactly the VM amount that needs to be posted. So the increment in 
the bank account is sufficient to cover the VM, so that party B does not need to arrange 
separately to fund the VM. Specifically, equation (4.b) suggests that the interest earned 
plus the net trading gain due to delta hedging would generate sufficient income that can be 
drawn to pay the VM. 
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Now if party B defaults at time s, with the option priced at V(s), party C already 
has V(s) amount of cash held as collateral and is not exposed to B’s default event. In the 
end, we find that the trade is counterparty risk free and fully funded by the cash collateral 
account. The interest rate earned on the cash collateral is then the derivatives financing rate 
rd in equation (8.a & 8.b), with rd = r. 
Let Wt denote the cash collateral account balance and rL denote the interest rate 
earned on the cash collateral, typically the Fed Fund rate in the US. Wt enters the wealth 
equations (3), πt = Mt + ΔtSt – Vt – Lt+Wt. For full cash collateralized trades, we have 
Wt=Vt, so Mt can be left to zero as πt is set to zero. This confirms that the cash collateral 
eliminates the need of a bank account. r is replaced by rL in the financing equation (4.a and 
4.b). Subsequently equation (7) also stands, but the appearance of r will be replaced by the 
cash collateral rate rL. So the discount rate now is the OIS rate, rather than an unspecified 
riskfree rate. 
Some may say that the OIS rate is a good approximation of the riskfree rate, but we 
emphasize that we don’t need to assume a riskfree rate at all. Because the OIS rates are 
marketwise rates and the assumed stock financing rates are also marketwise, accessible to 
every market participants, this rules out funding arbitrage by merit of equality among 
agents.  
Cash collateral is a special case where the derivative financing rate rd is well defined 
to be the OIS rate and its discounting role well accepted (Piterbarg, 2010, and Hull and 
White 2013). It has the essence of a private derivatives financing market where the funding 
rate equals to the OIS rate. In other cases, we can also derive a discount rate applicable for 
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different collateral asset types and margin schemes to determine an effective derivative 
financing rate. 
 
3. Discounting when uncollateralized 
 At the opposite end of fully cash collateralized options is uncollateralized options. 
The buyer of the option initially funds the purchase. Subsequently, no cash/fund exchanges 
hands until the option expiry when the call option payoff needs to be paid. Or if one of the 
parties default before the expiry, a default settlement cash flow could result. As a 
contingent liability of the option seller, it is simply inviting to think that an uncollateralized 
or unsecured option should be discounted in the same way as the issuer’s same ranked 
senior unsecured corporate debt does. 
3.1. What is funding value adjustment (FVA) 
 End-users selling options to dealer-banks are quite familiar with credit valuation 
adjustment (CVA) charges. Take for example, suppose the option is written by a 
counterparty with a default probability of 5% per annum, the CVA is computed roughly at 
2.6 so the final price is 29-2.6=26.4, where 29 is the default free option price, i.e., 
discounted at the OIS curve. It is not clear, however, what discount rate has been used to 
arrive at the final price of 26.4. Furthermore, CVA is computed at the derivative portfolio 
considered under a single netting set and allocated to each trade often based on simplistic 
rules. Such a CVA process necessarily blurs the discount curve further such that the final 
price is no longer associated with a discount rate as in equation (2). 
 For illustration purposes, let’s assume this option is the only position the end-user 
has with the bank. The saved 2.6 is the price of buying a protection on the 29 current option 
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price. Suppose the user actually spends that money to buy a protection from another bank 
D through a (contingent) credit default swap (CDS), paying exactly 2.6.  
It is very important to know that protection afforded under a CDS contract is 
unfunded. In plain English, the fund to pay for the end-user’s claims if party B defaults is 
not prepared or reserved beforehand. It is possible that the protection seller bank D might 
not be able to pay at then-time, for instance, if party B’s default also triggers D’s default. 
A (pre)funded protection is one that has set money aside in advance so that whenever B 
defaults, the user’s default exposure is guaranteed to be fully covered. Funded protection 
has another significant operational advantage over unfunded protection in that it avoids the 
need of a CDS settlement, which in most cases has been shown to be a tedious process, 
which sometimes require lengthy legal intervention. The end-user would in no doubt favor 
the funded protection.  
To obtain a funded protection, the end-user could short sell party B’s corporate 
bond in a notional amount that matches his option exposure to B. If B defaults, the end-
user will lose on his option exposure but gain on his short bond position. Since both bond 
and the option exposure are in the senior unsecured rank, they would recover at the same 
recovery rate and net out to no loss. The price to hedge is the manufactured dividend or par 
bond coupon, i.e., party B’s senior unsecured debt interest rate. Because the bond rate is 
normally higher than the CDS premium, the user would demand a steep price cut from 
party B, i.e., higher than 2.6. Assume the bond rate is 5% per annum, then a rough estimate 
of the new adjustment amount will be 4.33, making a new final price of 29-4.33 = 24.67. 
The difference between this new adjustment of 4.33 and the old CVA of 2.6 is an 
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adjustment responsible for the funded vs unfunded protection difference, and is thus called 
funding value adjustment (FVA). 
Dealers and banks have come up with slightly different perspectives. FVA was 
initially introduced to take into account of the fact that banks can’t fund their derivatives 
operations at the LIBOR level and as a result banks’ treasury departments charge 
derivatives trading desks internal funding rates aligned with their secondary market bond 
yields. Specifically, consider dealer B enters a long option with an uncollateralized client 
C and hedges (shorts) the option with another dealer bank A under a full CSA. Because 
party C does not post collateral and B has to post cash collateral to A, the trader has to 
borrow the cash collateral from his internal treasury department. If his treasury charges an 
interest rate of rb, then his net cost is rb - rL where rL is the interest rate earned on cash 
collateral. The net interest cost applies to the funding amount of V*, the option fair price 
under a full CSA, i.e., OIS discounted, default riskfree option price. By discounting each 
small time period’s cost (rb - r)V*ds and summing them up, traders define FVA for 
uncollateralized derivatives as follows, 
]),()()([ * 
T
t
bt dsstDsVrrEX       (9) 
where D(t,s) is an applicable and debatable discount factor from time s to time t, s>t.  
For some, it is the product of the riskfree discount factor and B’s own survival 
probability, capturing the fact that such a cost is only incurred while party B itself is 
operating. Others argue that it should be the product of the riskfree discount factor and the 
joint survival probability of party B and his counterparty C, for the collateral funding cost 
also disappears once party C defaults and the short option settles. Regardless which way it 
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goes, there is no clear identification of a discounting curve for the final price V=V*-X, as 
V* is discounted at the OIS rate and X is something else. 
This form of FVA has been controversial, invalidated in theory but nonetheless 
implemented in practice. For example, JP Morgan’s Q1 2014 report announced 1.5 billion 
dollar loss due to FVA charge on OTC derivatives and structured notes, citing as an 
illustration 50 bp FVA funding cost on 5 year duration, see Whittall (2014). Anderson, 
Duffie and Song (2019) prove that this kind of accounting loss is not justified and FVA as 
a cost of acquiring a derivative asset should land in the firm’s equity rather than its balance 
sheet. The most prominent argument (Hull and White 2014) has been that FVA calculations 
such as (9) could result in multiple fair values which depend on the pricing agents own 
funding curves and violate the law of one price, a topic of debate yet to close as theory and 
practice simply don’t seem to be converging. 
3.2. Liability-side pricing principle  
When a party, say B, carries an OTC derivative asset uncollateralized, it has an 
unsecured, senior ranked exposure to its counterparty -- party C. Because its primary risk 
can be hedged by dynamic trading in the underlying stock, the remaining risk is really 
credit risk, which resembles the usual corporate credit risk. Lou (2015b, 2016) provides a 
proof and generalizes it as the liability-side pricing principle, which states that an 
uncollateralized derivative’s future cash flows should be locally discounted at liability-
side’s senior unsecured rate. For a swap or swap portfolio, the instantaneous discount rate 
switches between party B and C’s local rates, depending on whether the forward npv is 
positive (an asset) or negative (a liability). 
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The key idea is that the fair instrument, for the parties of a bilateral derivative trade 
to hedge their counterparty exposure and to fund the derivative, is to have the party on the 
liability side deposit cash with the party on the asset side. The party making deposit is 
economically neutral if the deposit will earn a coupon rate same as the market rate of its 
debt. The deposit made outside of the derivative’s netting set would offset the derivative 
exposure via the Set-off provision in the ISDA Master Agreement or common laws. 
Equivalently, if the party’s bond is traded in a liquid market, a short hedge achieves the 
same purpose. 
To demonstrate, we consider a one-step binomial tree model shown in Figure 1. 
The stock price starts at 50, then either goes up to 64.201 at a probability of 0.4652, or goes 
down to 38.940. The option is issued by party C which could default during the period. 
Suppose that at t0, party B knows the price of the option at 6.468 and pays C that amount 
to purchase this uncollateralized option. Holding on the option after the purchase, B has an 
unsecured exposure to party C.  
 
 
Figure 1. One-step binomial tree (dt=0.25 year) illustrating the liability-side pricing 
principle. 
step 0 step 1
64.201 stock prc
14.201 opt payoff
6.607 deposit
stock prc 50.000 C default  
option val 6.468 set-off, no cash flow
C's deposit 6.468
38.940 stock prc
0.000 opt payoff
6.607 deposit
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To hedge its exposure to C, B could short C’s senior unsecured bond. Or as Lou 
(2015b) suggests, B could ask C to deposit $6.468 cash on which B would pay 8.5% interest 
rate, same as C’s par bond coupon rate. C is economically indifferent as he could raise the 
cash from the bond market at the same rate. The new liability assumed by issuing in the 
market place offsets his deposit (on the asset side) so that there is no net balance sheet 
impact. From cash flow perspective, C receives the market rate from B and pays out the 
same to bond investors. No cash flow is generated.  
From party B’s perspective, the derivative asset is financed by C’s deposit. No other 
forms of financing, including from own treasury, is necessary. Now imagine if C defaults, 
B has two transactions with C: the derivative receivable, and the deposit as a payable. 
Under common laws, the right to set-off would apply to determine the final settlement 
amount. Since the deposit amount is same as the derivative exposure, the derivative 
contract and the deposit set off completely. The net balance is zero and there is no default 
settlement cash flow. The cash deposit serves both purposes of hedging counterparty credit 
exposure and financing the derivative. The total economic cost of hedging and funding is 
simply the market rate of C’s debt5.  
The question then becomes how B will fund this 8.5% par coupon. The liability-
side pricing model (Lou, 2015b, 2016) puts this squarely back to the option pricing theory 
where the option has to accrue and to be discounted at this higher, non-riskfree rate. The 
B-S equation is revised as follows, 
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5 Here the derivative asset attracts liquidity at C’s unsecured rate. Thus rc is the derivative financing rate. But 
this is theoretical or implied, as holding an uncollateralized asset does not actually generate liquidity. 
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)0)(()0)(()(  tVIrtVIrtr cbe       (10.b)  
where rb(t) and rc(t) are B’s and C’s bond interest rates respectively, I(. ) is an indicator 
function, and re(t) is the effective discount rate. Equation (10) is written from party B’s 
perspective, i.e., positive V means that the option is an asset to B and a liability to C and C 
is said to be on the liability-side. If we split V into a positive part V+ and a negative part V-, 
so that V = V+ - V-, then )()()()( tVrtVrtVtr bce
  . The asset or receivable part of the 
derivative is discounted at the counterparty’s funding rate, while the liability or payable 
part at the firm’s own rate. Regardless, the discount rate is always on the liability-side.  
Accordingly, the risk neutral pricing formula under Q-measure for an option with 
a terminal payoff function H(T) is extended, 
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In the example given in Figure 1, B holds the option as an asset. C is the option 
writer or issuer, so re = rc, that is C’s rate of 8.5% becomes the discount rate.  
The (total) counterparty risk adjustment (CRA), denoted by X as the difference 
between the riskfree derivative price V* and V, is precisely given by, 
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This formula is interesting for it shows re as both the discount rate -- appearing in the 
exponent, and the financing rate -- appearing in the funding spread applied to V*.  
Until today, many derivatives end-users have remained performing LIBOR 
discounting for uncollateralized trades, although Hull and White (2013) argue that they 
should be discounted at the same OIS rate as for collateralized trades, but formula (11) 
shows neither role for LIBOR nor for OIS. Pre-crisis LIBOR rates are thought to roughly 
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reflect the credit risk profile of typical ‘AA’ rated banks who were able to fund in the 
proximity of LIBOR rates (Huge and Lando 1999). So to some, LIBOR rates are thought 
to be a good approximation to the riskfree rate as they had been mostly a few basis points 
away from other riskfree rate proxies such as the Treasuries repo rates. The industry’s 
adoption of the LIBOR curve, however, is based on their funding experience (Hull and 
White 2013) that the LIBOR swap curve is closer to where they fund OTC derivatives 
operations. Thanks to the financial crisis, we have finally come to a better understanding 
of how to discount the uncollateralized derivatives.   
Discounting unsecured exposures at the issuer’s unsecured rate, while seemingly as 
natural as discounting an issuer’s bond at the issuer’s yield curve, has proven to be evasive 
in bilateral defaultable OTC derivatives pricing. In fact, if one takes a corporate bond’s 
cash flows and prices it with the standard reduced form credit model calibrated to the CDS 
market, a different yield would result. The market has come to acknowledge the difference 
in CDS implied bond yield and market yield as the basis. Without incorporating the basis, 
the reduced form model is unable to reprice a zero coupon bond at the market, which is 
trivial shown in equation (11). In this sense, the liability-side pricing of uncollateralized 
derivatives is consistent with bond market pricing, as it correctly recovers the natural 
discount rate.  
 A side-effect of the liability-side discounting is that it doesn’t matter whether the 
base index is LIBOR or its replacement – SOFR. For cash collateralized derivatives, we 
use OIS curves; for uncollateralized, we apply parties’ bond curves.  
3.3. Partial collateralization 
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In a bit more general setting where the derivative is only partially cash 
collateralized and partially uncollateralized, the B-S equation can be shown to become 
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where Lt denotes the cash collateral amount, |L|<|V|, V-L the uncollateralized amount, and 
rL earned interest rate on Lt.  
If we write, 
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then PDE (13) becomes equation (10.a) with the effective rate (10.b) replaced by, 
)0())1(()0())1((  VIrrVIrrr LbbbLccce     (14) 
The effective discount rate is an average of the cash collateral rate and the unsecured rate 
with weights reflecting the proportion of secured and unsecured exposures. 
 
4. Liquidity rate for segregated cash collateral  
It is worth noting that in the derivation leading to PDEs and the effective discount 
rates (10) and (14), the cash collateral is allowed to comingle with the economy, typical for 
variation margin of the derivatives’ mark-to-market. Small volume end-users can elect to 
have their collateral segregated. Comingled cash is usable for the economy’s general 
operations, and economically serves both purposes of credit mitigation and derivatives 
funding. Cash collateral is imperfect when segregated, as credit protection is provided at 
the cash amount, but no part of it can be used to fund the derivatives. This becomes an 
intermediate case between (no-segregated) cash collateral that provides both protection and 
funding, and uncollateralized case that offers neither protection nor funding.  
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To determine the applicable discount rate, let’s consider party B and party C enter 
into an option trade under a CSA where full cash collateral is required but segregated in a 
separate bank account. Collateral posting mechanism is exactly same as the comingled 
case, i.e., both day 1 and variation margins are posted, except the posted cash is deposited 
in the bank account administrated by a trustee. Any interest earned on the bank account is 
promptly returned to the pledger by the trustee and is out of the benefactor’s reach. Should 
a credit event happen, the deposit account will be drawn to pay for default settlement. 
Because party B does not have access to the day 1 margin posted, B then has to 
fund the option purchase. Now assume party B has a financing account in Nt with rate rn, 
then N0 equals to the purchase price. The only difference of this segregated economy from 
the non-segregated economy of section 1.3 is default settlement. At the time of C’s default, 
cash will be released from the segregated bank account to B to cover any close-out 
payment. 
Following the same derivation procedure as in Section 1.1, with the funding account 
Nt replacing the money market account to provide fund at a rate of rn instead of r, we can 
easily obtain the same PDE as equation (10) except the discount rate is replaced by rn.  
A quick and seemingly natural choice of rn is bank B’s own funding rate. Such a 
choice would lead to the problem of having multiple fair values when multiple banks start 
to price it, in violation of the law of one price. A rational choice has to consider the 
economic content of the segregated collateral. To illustrate, B can segregate the option (as 
an asset) into a trust to issue a credit linked note (CLN) referencing the option and its 
segregated cash collateral. The CLN is linked to C’s credit, meaning that when C defaults, 
it will liquidate its reference assets and pay the noteholder. The issued amount of the CLN 
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equals to the amount of segregated cash collateral, Nt = Lt. CLN is priced at par with rn 
being its rate. The CLN noteholder can be fully repaid upon default termination, when the 
segregated cash collateral is released. So the CLN is subject to default event but won’t 
incur losses. Its pricing rate rn should therefore not contain C’s default risk. It reflects bond 
market liquidity and other non-credit, market structural factors (Hull and White 2014), and 
can be referred to as the issuer liquidity rate, denoted by µ.  
A firm’s liquidity rate might not be directly market observable but it can be inferred 
from the cash bond market and CDS market via a basis trade. Suppose a default riskfree 
party sets up a basis trade by holding a par bond at (continuously compounded) coupon 
rate rc issued by C and buying protection via a CDS on the issuer of the same maturity. 
Assuming that CDS is cleared through a CCP and is continuously rolled at CDS premium 
x, which is free of counterparty risk and also continuously compounded. Without 
considering gap risk and bond and CDS market liquidity risk, the basis trade is not subject 
to C’s default risk, so its no-arbitrage pricing rate has to be rc - x, i.e., µc = rc - x.  µc – r = 
rc – x - r is then the bond CDS basis (or funding basis).  
As an example, a firm may have a credit spread of 70 bps, i.e., rc – r=0.7% , while 
only 20 bps of it attributes to the liquidity basis, µc – r =0.2%, so 50 bps is due to default 
risk, rc –µc = 0.5%. Under zero-recovery assumption, µc=rc - λc, where λc is C’s default 
intensity. 
The liquidity rate’s fit for fair value purposes can also be illustrated by an informal 
market equilibrium argument. Because rn directly impacts derivatives pricing, party C has 
vested economic interest in rn. If rn is too high, for example, and C finds his own funding 
cost is lower, C would step in to buy the CLN, willing to pay at his own funding liquidity 
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rate, thus lowering rn. If rn is already low in the market place, C benefits, but B would want 
to have a claim of that benefit, essentially driving up rn back to C’s liquidity rate in the 
equilibrium. So in the end, rn = µc. 
Depending on the sign of the derivative fair value,  rn will be switching as well, and 
could be replaced by  
)0()0(  VIVIr bce  .       (15) 
The derivative is still financed on the liability-side, with a cost equal to liquidity 
basis or the bond-CDS basis, µb - r or µc  - r. PDE (10) with re in equation (15) remains the 
law of one price conforming. 
In the case where the segregated amount L is only a fraction of V (with the rest 
being unsegregated cash collateral), for V≠0, 
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The discount rate can be shown to be 
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More generally, we could introduce a flag χ, 0 meaning segregated, 1 comingled. 
Since non-segregated cash returns at rate rL, the effective discount rate for the PDE can be 
rewritten to accommodate both cases, 
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  For party C, its effective rate rec is a linear combination of the unsecured rate rc, the 
liquidity rate µc, and the cash rate rL, each applied to the unsecured (and unfunded) portion 
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1-ηc, secured but unfunded portion (1- χc)ηc, and χcηc the remaining secured and funded 
portion of the fair value V+. reb can be understood similarly. 
This concept of an effective derivative financing rate in the presence of 
counterparty credit risk and collateral is also evident in Hull and White (2014), where rd is 
shown using dealer or average dealers’ rates rather than liability-side’s rates. It is not seen 
in Burgard and Kjaer (2011), although their main result 1 (when the close-out uses risky 
market value) can be easily converted to yield Fccec rrrRr  ))(1(  and 
rrrRr bbeb  ))(1( , where R is the recovery rate, rF equals reb since the derivative 
can’t be repo-ed. But these are still different from (18). Brigo et al (2014) and Anderson, 
Duffie, and Song (2019) do not present such a form, as they follow the reduced form risk 
neutral pricing framework.  
When securities are used as derivatives collateral, their quantities are determined 
by collateral haircuts – discounts applied to their market values. And they have to go 
through the repo market to transform into cash, and are subject to repo haircuts. The 
differences in collateral haircuts and repo haircuts create pockets of unsecured exposure or 
secured but segregated exposure. The resulting discount rate is found to be a mixture of the 
OIS rate, the senior unsecured rates, and the liquidity rates of the counterparties, see Lou 
(2017). 
 
5. Binomial Tree Pricing 
The switching effective discount rate in equation (10.b, 14 and 18) depends on the 
sign of the fair value, so the fair value formula in (11) is generally recursive, unless the 
sign of the derivatives is known for sure such as a call option. This type of coupling 
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between the discount rate and the fair value reflects the nonlinear nature of pricing with 
counterparty risk. In our construct, the only nonlinearity appears in the effective discount 
rate, unlike Burgard and Kjaer (2011), where the coupling binds the unknown fair value 
and its adjustment through exposure amounts. Brigo et al (2014), for example, have to 
introduce a separate non-linear valuation adjustment in their backward stochastic 
differential equation (SDE) to correct an overlap in value adjustments. 
 Synthesizing derivative collateralization effect into one derivative financing rate 
has its advantages. For example, it becomes obvious that party C’s zero coupon bond will 
be priced at C’s senior unsecured rate rc, a critical model consistency test not satisfied by 
all. Moreover, it allows us to bypass valuation adjustments to compute the fair value 
directly. 
This coupling could post a challenge to numerical solutions. For low dimension 
pricing problems such as an equity derivative portfolio with a single underlying or a swap 
portfolio on the same reference rate (e.g., LIBOR), a finite difference method is developed 
(Lou 2015b). Also as demonstrated in Lou (2016), a Monte Carlo simulation with 
regression procedure can be developed focusing on the convergence of the discount rate. 
In this section, we enlist a binomial tree procedure to help understand the role of the 
effective discount rate and to provide a rudimentary implementation.  
Consider a one-step tree where the stock price starts at S, goes up to Su, or down to 
Sd. The option payoff at up and down nodes are Hu and Hd respectively. At the moment, 
we don’t know what discount rate, rb or rc, to use yet as it depends on the option fair value 
at t0. One could use rb to discount the expected payoff of pHu+(1-p)Hd to arrive at a value 
vb. If vb is negative, then we know the choice of rb is correct, so V= vb. Otherwise, we 
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should do it again with rc as the discount rate. This kind of trial and error is not necessary, 
however. If we write down the one step pricing formula,  
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then since the discount factor Tree
  is always positive, the sign of V is the same as the 
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the following decoupled discounting and pricing formula, 
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Below we give an example on a 2-step binomial tree used to price an 
uncollateralized option strategy which has mixed positive and negative terminal values. A 
shifted stock forward is a combination of a long European call option at a lower strike K1 
and a short put at a higher strike K2 of the same expiry. It has a positive payoff when the 
terminal stock price ST is greater than the mean of K1 and K2 and negative payoff otherwise. 
Figure 2 shows a sample binomial tree solving the forward’s fair value with K1 =45 and K2 
=55. 
The unsecured rates for bank B and customer C are 5.7% and 8.5% respectively. 
Notice that at step 1 up node, it is an asset to B, so its counterparty C’s rate is used to 
discount. At the lower node, npv is negative, so it becomes a liability of B and B’s own 
rate of 5.7% is used. The final price is 0.955.  Note the same tree can be used to compute 
the default risk free price by simply replacing the discount rates with the OIS rate. For 
those interested in valuation adjustments, CRA defined in (12) as the difference between 
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the riskfree price and the final price is 0.066. Option Greeks such as delta, gamma and vega 
can be obtained in the usual way. 
 
 
Figure 2. Two step binomial tree computing the fair value of an uncollateralized option 
portfolio consisted of a long call at 45 strike and a short put at 55 strike, i.e., a 
synthetic shifted forward, with expiry in 6 months, repo rate 5.5%, volatility 50%, 
up probability 0.4652. 
 
This simple example can be easily extended to handle American options, and a 
portfolio of options on the same underlying stock. Similarly, an interest rate tree can be 
built to price swaps and interest rate derivatives between two defaultable counterparties. 
Unlike derivatives portfolios or netting sets between dealer-banks which involve many 
different underlying instruments, end-users’ derivatives portfolios are often segregated or 
one-sided which may find the binomial tree procedure helpful. 
 
6. Value adjustments (XVA) based on decomposition of the discount rate 
 From the pricing point of view, once the discount rate is determined, we could 
proceed to solve for the final price and its sensitivities or Greeks as desired. XVAs are only 
step 2
82.436
 37.436
step 1
64.201
17.050
step 0 0.085
stock price 50.000 50
option val 0.955 0
disc rate 0.085
38.940
-13.008
0.057
30.327
-24.673
   
32 
 
necessary because current models typically separate pricing of primary market risk factors 
(such as stock price, volatility, and interest rate) and counterparty risk factors. When 
separately computed, XVA often are not consistent with the final price. It is pointed out, 
for example, that practitioners’ FVA leaves out interest rate sensitivity unhedged, therefore 
adding FVA to the riskfree price does not yield the true fair price (Lou 2016).  
In Lou (2015b), the total counterparty risk adjustment (CRA, equation 12) of an 
uncollateralized trade is decomposed into a coherent form of bilateral CVA and FVA, 
which corresponds to a decomposition of the spread re–r into a default risk measure and 
the funding or liquidity basis. This form of definition avoids overlapping DVA (debt value 
adjustment, a benefit related to not having to pay the full amount of a liability after a default 
event of the issuer) of a derivatives liability and its FVA benefit (of not having to fund 
one’s own derivatives liability), is balance sheet neutral, conforms to the law of one price, 
and is thus better suited for fair value purposes.  
This decomposition is self-consistent and avoids any overlap among XVAs, in that 
adding up all XVAs results in the total adjustment which is precisely defined. To compare 
with typical XVA definitions, below we list our version of CVA and FVA for a pure asset 
such as an uncollateralized option, 
])([ *

T
t
dur
scct dseVrEcva
s
t c      (21) 
])([ *

T
t
dur
sct dseVrEfva
s
t c      (22) 
Note the discount rate in the above is always the unsecured rate of the issuer C. 
Typical industry unilateral CVA definition is written as  
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where R is the recovery rate of the counterparty, λ is C’s default intensity or hazard rate, 
Q(s) could be the survival probability of party C or the joint survival probability of B and 
C. Q(s)λds is the (risk-neutral) default probability in time period [s, s+ds]. Since we 
normally hold )()1( ccrR   true, the difference between (21) and (23) is that (21) 
uses C’s bond discount while (23) uses the product of riskfree discount and the survival 
probability. The problem with (23) is that even if we define FVA solely on the liability-
side’s funding basis in accordance with (23), i.e., write FVA as  
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CVA (23) plus FVA (24) does not return to the total valuation adjustment in equation (12) 
and will not reprice a simple debt instrument such as a bond. 
Anderson, Duffie and Song (2019) prove that traders may incorporate the FVA cost 
into bid/ask to recoup value for equity holders, but not the fair value, although it remains 
subject to a CVA adjustment to account for the probability of counterparty default. Their 
formula doesn’t seem to reprice a bond and they have been silent about the basis. It could 
be interesting to see how Anderson et al (2016)’s framework could be extended to 
incorporating the basis. 
Our FVA (eqt. 22) corresponds to the liquidity component of funding an 
uncollateralized exposure. This is consistent with Hull and White (2014)’s finding that a 
dealer bank’s funding of an uncollateralized asset would incur a debt valuation adjustment 
(DVA) that offsets its FVA cost to the extent that only the dealer’s basis contribution is 
left. Our version of FVA however is attributed to the bond-CDS basis of the issuer, not to 
that of the bank, and, as a result, is compliant of the law of one price. 
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Note that our XVAs use the same discount rate as the pricing equation, which 
facilitates numerical solutions. The binomial tree model developed in Section 4 can also be 
extended to compute these various adjustments, taking advantage of the switching rates 
being the same for XVA as for the fair value. To facilitate binomial tree computation, cva 
formula can be rewritten, 
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where cvat2 is the cva on a node at time t2, and we compute cva backward from t2 to t1, t2 > 
t1. At expiry T, cvaT=0.  Other XVAs are similar. 
The total counterparty risk value adjustment (CRA) can be broken down into 
bilateral CVA composed of cva and dva with CVA=cva-dva, and bilateral FVA composed 
of cfa and dfa with FVA=cfa-dfa, per Table 1 below, 
 
Table 1. XVA of long or short shifted forward breaks down into CVA (cva and dva) and 
FVA (cfa and dfa). The riskfree price is 1.09. The unsecured rates for bank B and 
customer C are 5.7% and 8.5% respectively. B and C’s liquidity rates are 5.2% and 
5.5%, leaving out 0.5% and 3% as credit default rates respectively. 
  
Short 
Fwd 
Long 
Fwd 
final prc 1.032 -1.127 
Cva 0.059 0.044 
Cfa 0.01 0.007 
Dva 0.008 0.01 
Dfa 0.003 0.004 
CRA 0.058 0.037 
 
Figure 3 shows how such a computation is done for the case of cva. Each node’s 
option fair value and discount rate are same as in Figure 2. The blacked box now shows 
the riskfree fair value to facilitate the XVA calculations. 
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Figure 3. Using the same binomial tree to compute XVA. Shown example is for cva. 
 
One way to break out CRA (Lou 2015b) is to run the binomial tree with both parties 
using the OIS discount rate to get V*, then shift party C’s discount rate to its liquidity rate 
c to get V1. Then cfa (credit funding adjustment, part of FVA due to counterparty) equals 
to V*-V1. Further shifting C’s discount rate to its unsecured rate rc to compute V2, then cva 
equals to V1-V2. Now keeping C’s discount rate as is, and shifting B’s rate to its liquidity 
rate b to compute V3, then the self-funding benefit, dfa equals to V2-V3. Lastly, shifting 
B’s rate to its senior unsecured rate rb to get V, and dva = V3-V.  This is different from 
Figure 3, where they are computed using the same effective discount rate throughout, but 
the total valuation adjustment is conserved. 
The binomial tree model can be easily built for interest rates or foreign exchange 
(FX) rates so that swap and FX derivatives portfolios can be evaluated by end-users. 
Admittedly for higher dimension problems, for example, a derivatives portfolio involving 
step 2
37.436
37.436
step 1
17.200
17.050
step 0 0.085
riskfree val 1.021 0.126 0
option val 0.955 0
disc rate 0.085
xva 0.066 -13.031
-13.008
0.057
0.000 -24.673
-24.673
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many stocks, the binomial tree approach is of limited use. Such is the case, the Monte Carlo 
(MC) simulation approach presented in Lou (2016) can be utilized to compute XVA.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The risk-neutral pricing formula where derivatives’ cash flow is discounted at the 
riskfree rate to arrive at the fair value has long drifted away from us. In particular, after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, various value adjustments proposed in a variety of ways have 
obscured this mathematically beautiful and financially intuitive formula. Derivatives 
pricing and valuation have become overly complex and almost inaccessible to end-users in 
the investment community. This paper attempts to recover the formula by generalizing a 
new discount rate, to take into account of counterparty credit risk, funding, margin and 
collateralization. 
At one extreme is the well accepted OIS rate, applicable to fully cash collateralized 
derivatives. At the other extreme is the issuer’s senior unsecured borrowing rate, applicable 
to uncollateralized derivatives. For derivatives collateralized with segregated cash, the 
proper discount rate for the fair value is identified as the issuer’s liquidity rate. 
Presentation of such a rate extends the classic risk neutral pricing formula from 
default free counterparties to bilateral defaultable counterparties. The risk neutral measure 
stays and the payoffs are the same: only the riskfree rate needs to be replaced to arrive at 
the final price that reflects counterparty risk and its mitigation effect by means of margin 
and collateralization. Although the effective discount rate is coupled with the fair value in 
general, a binomial tree could unlock the coupling. In particular, an end-user friendly 
binomial tree model enables the final price to be computed efficiently, useful for low 
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dimension portfolios such as interest rate swaps, foreign exchange swaps, and individual 
equity or commodity derivative portfolios. 
Our discount rate formulation enables derivatives end-users to dissect various 
forms of adjustments, or XVAs, by decomposing the effective derivative financing rate 
into relevant risk factors. CVA (C = credit), for example, corresponds to the default risk as 
usual, and FVA (F = funding) to the funding risk component of the bond credit spread. 
Contrary to current industry implementations where the default free fair value is computed 
in one system and XVAs are computed in other systems, sometimes with a number of 
distinct XVA models, this allows XVAs and the fair value to be computed simultaneously 
within one module.  
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